In the Lattice Agreement (LA) problem, originally proposed by Attiya et al. [1] , a set of processes has to decide on a chain of a lattice. More precisely, each correct process proposes an element e of a certain join-semi lattice L and it has to decide on a value that contains e. Moreover, any pair pi, pj of correct processes has to decide two values deci and decj that are comparable (e.g., deci ≤ decj or decj < deci).
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault-tolerance is a key research topic in distributed computing: reliable algorithms have been deeply investigated in classic message passing [2] and in newer model of computations [3] , [4] , [5] . A special mention has to be given to algorithms for distributed agreement [2] . They represent a cornerstone of todays cloud-based services. In particular, practical and efficient implementations of distributed consensus, transformed Internet from a large computers network to a world-scale service platform. Despite its fundamental role, distributed consensus is impossible to solve deterministically in asynchronous settings, where communication latencies cannot be bounded. To cope with this limit, practical systems trade off consistency criteria (allowing weaker agreement properties) with liveness (guaranteeing termination only in long-enough grace periods where the system "behaves" like a synchronous one). For such a reason, agreement properties weaker than consensus proved to be extremely effective for the implementation of a broad family of distributed applications, since they can be used in systems where consensus cannot be solved, or they can be faster than consensus algorithms circumventing time-complexity lower bounds. Lattice Agreement. In this paper we investigate an agreement problem that is weaker than consensus: the Lattice Agreement (LA) problem. In LA, introduced by Attiya et al. [1] , each process p i has an input value x i drawn from the join semilattice and must decide an output value y i , such that (i) y i is the join of x i and some set of input values and (ii) all output values are comparable to each other in the lattice, that is they are all located on a single chain in the lattice (see Figure  1 ). LA describes situations in which processes need to obtain some knowledge on the global execution of the system, for example a global photography of the system. In particular Attiya et al. [1] have shown that in the asynchronous shared memory computational model, implementing a snapshot object is equivalent to solving the Lattice Agreement problem. Faleiro et al. [8] have shown that in a message passing system a majority of correct processes and reliable communication channels [7] proposed a less restrictive definition of Byzantine LA, in which correct processes can decide also values proposed by Byzantine. Authors have then shown that LA can be solved for any possible lattice when f < n 3 : they proposed a solution for Byzantine LA in asynchronous systems that terminates in O(f ) rounds; the same paper also proposed a Generalized version of the algorithm and built on top of it a Replicated State Machine that executes commutative operations. In this paper we adopt the Byzantine LA definition from [7] , since it allows to circumvent some restrictions of [11] and it is usable in many practical scenario. The same definition has also been recently used by Zheng and Garg [6] , where they show that LA can 1 Actually, it can be solved faster than log(f ) on specific lattices, the ones having height less than log f [10] , however in this paper we are interested only in worst case performance. be solved in synchronous systems with O( √ f ) rounds also in presence of Byzantine failures. Contributions. In this paper we present new contributions for the Byzantine LA problem in synchronous settings. Our first results is for systems with only authenticated channels (i.e., signatures are not available), in such systems we show that Byzantine LA on arbitrary lattices cannot be solved, in synchronous systems, with f = n/3 or more faulty processes (Section III). Interestingly, such proof shows that the algorithm of Zheng and Garg [6] is tight in the number of tolerable failures. On the positive side we show algorithms that solve LA and Generalized LA, with and without signatures, having better running time that the state-of-the-art. Looking at the model with signatures, we show a novel algorithm for LA that works in a synchronous system model, tolerates up to f byzantine failures (where f < n/3 ) and that terminates in O(log f ) rounds. The algorithm improves over the LA β algorithm from Garg at al. [10] by using a similar construction, but adding tolerance to Byzantine failures. We make use of a modified Gradecast algorithm that allows processes to prove that a message has been seen by all correct processes in the system. (Sections IV-V) We conclude our investigation on LA by briefly discussing how to remove signatures and make our construction work only with authenticated channels trading-off part of its resiliency: we are able to tolerate f < n/4 failures (Section VI). In the last part of the manuscript, we devote our attention to Generalized Lattice Agreement (Section VII). Specifically, we show a transformer that, using as building block a generic LA algorithm, creates a Generalized Lattice Agreement algorithm. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time GLA is investigated in synchronous systems. Table I compares our results with the literature. For space reason some details and proofs are omitted and can be found in the full version [12] .
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II. SYSTEM MODEL, NOTATION, AND PRELIMINARIES
We use the usual message passing models with unique identifiers (IDs). There is a set Π of n processes with unique IDs in {1, . . . , n} connected by a complete communication graph. The system is synchronous, and the execution of the algorithm can be divided in discrete finite time units called rounds. In each round a process is able to send messages to its neighbours (send phase), and receive all messages sent to it at the beginning of the round (receive phase). Processes in Π are partitioned in two sets F and C. Processes in C are correct, they faithfully follow the distributed protocol. Processes in F are Byzantine, they arbitrarily deviate from the protocol. As usual when Byzantine failures are considered, we assume that the communication channels are authenticated by mean of Message Authentication Codes (MAC). The authenticated channels are the only assumption used in Section III. In Section IV we assume that there is a public key infrastructure that allows processes to cryptographically sign messages, that can be lately verified by other processes. This model has authenticated messages. Byzantine processes are polynomially bounded and cannot forge signatures of correct processes. For an easier presentation we explain our algorithms for the case of n = 3f + 1, where f = |F |, however they can be easily adapted for any other n > 3f + 1.
Notation. With we indicate the empty string. Given a string G, with |G| we indicate the length of the string (| | = 0), with G[j] and 0 ≤ j < |G| we indicate the character of string G in position j. With G[k : l] (given 0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ |G|), we indicate the substring of G between position k and l. As an example given G = ssms, we have G[0] = s and G[0 : 1] = ss. Given two strings a and b with a · b we indicate the string obtained by concatenating b after a.
a) The Byzantine Lattice Agreement Problem: Each process p i ∈ C starts with an initial input value pro i ∈ E with E ⊆ V (set E is a set of allowed proposal values). Values in V form a join semi-lattice L = (V, ⊕) for some commutative join operation ⊕:
The task that processes in C want to solve is the one of Lattice Agreement, and it is formalised by the following properties:
• Liveness: Each process p i ∈ C eventually outputs a decision value dec i ∈ V ; • Stability: Each process p i ∈ C outputs a unique decision value dec i ∈ V ; • Comparability: Given any two pairs p i , p j ∈ C we have that either dec i ≤ dec j or dec j ≤ dec i ; • Inclusivity: Given any correct process p i ∈ C we have that pro i ≤ dec i ;
• Non-Triviality: Given any correct process p i ∈ C we have that dec i ≤ (X ∪ B), where X is the set of proposed values of all correct processes (X : {pro i | with p i ∈ C}), and B ⊆ E is |B| ≤ f . Lattice definitions. A path of length k between two distinct elements u and vof the latttice is a sequence of k + 1 distinct elements (e 0 , e 2 , . . . , e k ) such that e 0 = u ≤ e 1 ≤ e 2 ≤ . . . ≤ e k−1 ≤ e k = v. As an example the path between {1, 2, 3} and {1} in the lattice of Figure  1 has length 2. We say that a v ∈ V is minimal if it does not exists u ∈ V , with u = v, such that u ⊕ v = v (i.e., it does not exists an u ≤ v). As in [6] we define the height of an element v in a lattice (V, ⊕) has the length of the longest path from any minimal element to v in the lattice (as an example the lattice in Figure 1 has height 4). A sub-lattice of (V, ⊕) is a subset U of V closed with respect to the join operation, the definition of height for a sub-lattice does not change.
Preliminaries. In the rest of the paper we will assume that L is a semi-lattice over sets (V is a set of sets) and ⊕ is the set union operation. This is not restrictive, it is well known that any join semi-lattice is isomorphic to a semi-lattice of sets with set union as join operation. An important lattice is the one on the power set of the first {1, . . . , n} natural numbers with the union as join operation (see Figure 1 ), we will use as shorthand for such lattice the notation L n (note that n is also the number of processes). We will show that an algorithm solving lattice agreement exclusively on such a lattice (the GAC of Section IV) can be used as building block to solve lattice agreement on an arbitrary lattice (Section V). When L n is considered, the height of an element e is equal to its cardinality (i.e, |e| see Figure 1 ), given a sub lattice of L n its height is upper bounded by the difference between the minimum and maximum cardinality of its elements.
III. AUTHENTICATED CHANNELS AND NO SIGNATURE -NECESSITY OF 3f + 1 PROCESSES IN

SYNCHRONOUS SYSTEMS
In the following we show that 3f + 1 processes are necessary when there are no signatures. Lemma 1. It does not exist any algorithm solving Byzantine LA on arbitrary lattices in a synchronous system with 3 processes when one is faulty. The impossibility holds even when relaxing the Non-Triviality allowing |B| ≤ k for any fixed k.
Proof. We first discuss the case of k = 1. Let A be an algorithm solving LA with 3 processes when one is faulty. Since A works on arbitrary lattices it should also work on the lattices induced by the union operation on the power set of the first 6 natural numbers with E = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}}. Now let us consider the hexagonal system of Figure 2 . Such a system is constituted by 6 processes p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 with an edge between each p i , p j such that i = j ± 1 and one edge between p 1 and p 6 . Each of the six processes has as input an unique value in [1, 6] , just for simplicity process p i has input {i}. Note that even if A is an algorithm for three processes, it is possible to execute A on the hexagon, but its behaviour does not necessarily follows the LA specification.
In the figure we have 6 triangles, each triangle is related to a corresponding edge in the hexagon. The relationship is such that the view of two neighbour processes in the hexagon is equal to the view of two processes in a triangle where the third process is a Byzantine simulating the behaviour of the other processes in the hexagon. As example: the view of processes p 1 , p 2 in the hexagon is the same that p 1 , p 2 would have in triangle t green , analogously the view of p 6 , p 1 in the hexagon is the same view of p 6 , p 1 in t blue . Note that A once executed on any of the triangle in the figure has to follow the LA specification.
A run of A on the hexagon in principle has an undefined behaviour. However we observe that a run of A on the hexagon eventually terminates on each process, this is because each process has a local view that is consistent with a system of 3 processes one of which is a Byzantine. Recall, that the local view of each process p i in the hexagon is exactly the same view that the process has in the two triangles on the right, and A being a correct algorithm when 3 processes are considered the algorithm will correctly terminate in each triangle in the right.
Moreover, each process will output a decision value that must be the same that the process will output in the corresponding triangles.
Let dec 1 , dec 2 , dec 3 , dec 4 , dec 5 , dec 6 be the decisions of processes dictated by A (naturally we have dec i decision of p i ). The triangles on the right impose a certain number of comparability relationships among these decisions. Recall, that each decision is a subset, not necessarily proper, of [1, 6] , and that the comparability in this setting is the relationship of inclusion. An example is triangle t green that imposes the comparability between dec 1 and dec 2 , that is either dec 1 ⊂ dec 2 or dec 2 ⊆ dec 1 . In the following we use dec i ↔ dec j to indicate that dec i must be comparable with dec j . Before continuing with the proof we give the following technical observation: consider a collection of m sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m such that for each S i we have i ∈ S i . If it holds that S j ↔ S i+1 for all j ∈ [1, m − 1] then there exists an |S k | ≥ m.
Therefore, let us take w.l.o.g. dec 1 , and let us walk in clockwise direction for 3 steps on the hexagon. On this walk we have: dec 1 ↔ dec 2 ↔ dec 3 ↔ dec 4 , by the inclusivity property we have for each dec i that i ∈ dec i . We can apply the aforementioned observation and state that one of the dec i has cardinality at least 4 violating the non-triviality property of A on some triangle (recall that k being equal to 1 we have |B| ≤ 1). The generalised proof for an arbitrary k follows the same reasoning using: a lattice on the power set of the first 3(k + 1) natural numbers, E = {{1}, . . . , {3(k + 1)}} and a 3(k+1)−gon instead of an hexagon. We then walk on the 3(k +1)−gon for k +2 steps instead of 3. We will have a chain dec 1 ↔ dec 2 ↔ . . . ↔ dec k+3 where by inclusivity of A on the corresponding triangle we have i ∈ dec i , and where our observation shows that one of the decisions contains at least k + 3 distinct elements of E violating the non-triviality on some triangle.
From the above lemma, by using a classic simulation argument we have: The proof of Theorem 1 does not work in a system with authenticated messages (i.e., signatures), it is therefore unkown whether 3f + 1 processes are necessary also in this model. Interestingly, in [7] it is shown that, when the system is asynchronous, 3f + 1 processes are necessary also when authenticated messages are available.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR L n : GRADE AND CLASSIFY (GAC)
In this section we show an algorithm that works on L n . The algorithm terminates in O(log(n)) rounds. We will then discuss in Section V how to use this algorithm so solve LA on arbitrary join semi-lattices, and how to adapt it to work in O(log(f )) rounds.
Our algorithm is based on the algorithmic framework of Zheng et al. [10] adapted to tolerate Byzantine failures. As in the original, the algorithm works by continuously partitioning processes in masters and slaves sets. Partitioning is recursively operated in successive epochs. Processes that have been assigned to the same For each edge there is a corresponding triangle that is a legal starting configuration of A with one Byzantine. As an example, take p 1 , p 2 in the hexagon. They have the exactly same view of p 1 , p 2 in tgreen where the other node is bgreen a Byzantine that simulates the behaviour of p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 in the hexagon. partition in each epoch are a "group". We indicate a generic group G at epoch ep with the string s · σ, where σ is in {s, m} ep−1 . As an example, the string ssm indicates the set of process that at the end of epochs 0 and 1 entered the group of slaves (string ss) and then, at the end of epoch 2, entered in the masters group (string ssm). When we write p ∈ G, we indicate that process p belongs to the group of processes identified by string G.
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The algorithm then enforces some properties on the partitions generated at an epoch ep on a Group G:
• each master process in G · m adjusts its proposal to be a superset of each possible decision of a slave process in G · s. • the height of a sub-lattice in which processes in G · m (or G · s) are allowed to decide halves at each epoch.
Thanks to the above properties each group becomes independent and has to solve the lattice agreement on a lattice that has half of the height of the original. A key concept for our algorithm is the one of "admissible value", a value is admissible, for a certain epoch, if it is ensured that it will not conflict with decisions of processes that have been elected as masters in a previous epoch. This is done by showing a cryptographical proof that such a value can be accepted by a slave since it is in the proposal value of each master the slave could conflict with. After O(log(n)) rounds the algorithm terminates (each group operates on a lattice constituted by a single point).
A. The Provable Gradecast Primitive
The algorithm makes use of the gradecast primitive introduced by Ben-Or et al. in [13] . Such primitive is similar to a broadcast, we have a sender process p i that sends a message m, each other process p j , after 3 rounds, outputs a tuple (p i , m j , c j ) where c j ∈ {0, 1, 2} is a score of the correctness of p i . The gradecast ensures the following properties:
• for any two correct processes p j , p if c j > 0 and c > 0 than m j = m . • for any two correct processes p j , p we have |c j −c | ≤ 1 • if the gradecast sender is correct, than for any correct process p j we have c j = 2. • for any correct process p j if (p i , m j , 0) then m j = ⊥.
Intuitively, if we let processes communicate by mean of the gradecast primitive we force Byzantines to send at most two different messages to the set C of correct processes, and one of these messages has to be ⊥. We modify the original gradecast to make it "provable". In our version of the gradecast each correct process outputs a tuple composed by 4 objects (p i , m j , c i , S i,mj ) where S i,mj is a special object that can either be ⊥ or a seenall proof. In case S i,mj is different from ⊥, then it is a cryptographic proof that can be shown to other processes and it implies that, any correct process p ∈ C has seen a rank, for the gradecast of message m j from process p i , that is at least 1. Moreover, we have that if c i = 2 then S i,mj = ⊥. Practically, the modification of the original gradecast are contained, and are limited to the second and third round of the algorithm. The original gradecast, with source p s works as follows: in the first round p s broadcasts a message m to all processes; in the second round each correct process relays the message received by p s (it ignores messages from other processes); at the end of the second round a correct process selects the most frequent message received, and if such message was received by at least a quorum of n − f processes then it relays the message at the beginning of the third round; at the end of the third round each correct selects the most frequent message received and it ranks it 2 and delivers it if the message was received by at least n − f processes; if it was received by at least f + 1 it delivers it and ranks it 1, otherwise it delivers ⊥ with rank 0.
In our version, see Algorithm 1, the relaying process signs the relay sent at the beginning of round 3 (see line 15) and a process that sees a message with rank 2 collects the n − f (i.e., 2f + 1 if n = 3f + 1) signed messages (see line 22). These signed messages constitute a proof that the message has been seen by all: delivered by each correct with rank at least 1. Note that the algorithm is for a single instance and a single determined sender, however one can trivially run in parallel an instance for each possible sender in the system.
We do not prove the properties discussed above for our version of gradecast, they immediately derives from the correctness of the original algorithm [13] . Consider an instance of gradecast with source p s . If a process p i , whether Byzantine or correct, can produce a seen-all proof for a message m, then each process p ∈ C delivered message m with rank at least 1 at the end of the gradecast instance.
B. Detailed Algorithm Description
Processes communicate by provable gradecasts. The three rounds necessary to execute a gradecast instance form a single epoch. We assume that in each epoch there are n concurrent instances of gradecast running, one for each possible sender. The pseudo-code is in Algorithm 2.
1) Epoch ep = 0: Epoch 0 has a special structure. Correct processes belong to a single group G = . In this Algorithm 2 GAC -Algorithm for process p i 1: t d = 0, tu = n, tm = tu 2 , G = , P roof s = {}, pro i = ∅ 2: function LA-PROPOSE(pro i ) 3:
pro i = pro i 4:
GRADECAST(M = (pro i , G, ⊥)) Epoch 0 -start 5:
updateproof s(pro i , P i , 0) Epoch 0 -end 8:
for ep ∈ [1, . . . , log(n)) + 1] do 9:
GRADECAST(M = (pro i , G, P roof s)) 10:
if CLASSIFY(V i ) = s then 13:
if |V | ≤ tm then 23:
return s 24:
else 25:
return m 26: function FILTER(P ) 27: 1 , the group G = s encloses all the processes and the thresholds are t d = 0, t m = n 2 and t u = n. a) Value gradecast.: An epoch starts by making each correct process p j in a group G gradecast a message M j containing, its proposal value pro i , the group to which p j belongs, and an admissibility proof for each element in pro i (the structure and the precise purpose of this proof is defined later).
Each other correct process p i in a group G receives, by mean of the gradecast, a set of tuples: P i :
We define a special set of values V i that is a subset of values in messages contained in P i . Set V i contains all "admissible values" in P i and such that: (1) the rank of the message carrying the value is at least 1 and (2) the sender of the message is in G.
Value v is admissible for process p i in epoch ep if the message that carries v contains also an "admissibility proof" proving that v has been seen by all correct processes in SLV (
where SLV (Set) is a filter function that removes from the set of string Set all the strings that end with letter m. As an example considering G = ssmsm we have SLV (s, ss, ssm, ssms, ssmsm) = {s, ss, ssms}. Essentially, there must be a proof showing that v has been seen with rank 1 by all processes in the epochs in which processes in G have been classified as slave. The actual structure of this proof is described later (Section IV-B3).
Process p i becomes a group slave if |V i | ≤ t m , it becomes a group master if t m < |V i |. If p i becomes a slave, it enters the group G · s. Otherwise, it becomes a master, and it enters G · m. b) Slaves actions: If a process p i is a slave, it updates its set of thresholds as
Finally, a slave does not update its proposed value pro i , in the next epoch it will have again the exactly same value it had in the current epoch. Regarding the admissibility proof, a correct slave has the duty to collect an admissibility proof for its value proposed pro i this is done by collecting the seen-all proof generated by gradecasting its pro i at the beginning of the epoch. Regarding the admissibility proof, a correct master has no duty in creating an admissibility proof for its new pro i , but it has to collect proofs to show that any value inserted in pro i was admissible in G[0 : ep − 1].
3) Admissibility proof: A message m containing a value v carries an admissibility proof for v and group G if message m contains for each, also non-proper, prefix G[0 : j] of G terminating with character s (for j in {0, 1, . . . , |G| − 1}), a seen-all proof for m with a sender p in G[0 : j − 1]. From Oservation 1, it is immediate to see that an admissibility proof for G implies that all correct processes in SLV (G[0 : 1], G[0 : 2], . . . , G[0 : |G| − 1]) received v in the value gradecast phase and ranked the source of the gradecast at least 1. See Figure 3 for a graphical representation of the usefulness of such a proof. Assume there exists an admissibility proof for value v and group G = ssms, then there is a seen-all proof for the epochs 0, 1, 3 and groups in G s : {s, ss, ssms}(marked as green in the figure) . This implies that, in each of these epochs, value v has been seen by each correct process with rank at least 1. In particular, a seen-all proof for value v and group ss implies that v has been gradecasted by a process in group s, and it has been received by all correct with rank at least 1. This implies that v has been inserted in the proposal of all correct masters in group sm (in the figure we represent with an orange border the processes that have v in their proposal). This means that a master in ssm can update its proposal inserting v, and it knows that it will still be comparable with the decision of any process in a group with prefix sm. Iterating the reasoning, a chain of seen-all proofs, the first for group ss and the second for group ssms, implies that v is in the proposal of all correct processes in a group with prefix sm or ssmm, and thus a future master in ssmmsm can safely include v in its proposal. The necessity of a seenall proof for epoch 0, and thus for group s is needed to force Byzantine processes to commit to at most f values. This is due to the fact that f Byzantine processes are able to create admissibility proofs for at most f distinct values in epoch 0.
4) Termination: A process p i terminates the above algorithm when the epoch is log(n) + 1. Upon termination it decides its value pro i .
C. Correctness of GAC
Definition 1. Let A(G) be the set of values admissible for correct processes in group G during the gradecast of epoch |G|.
Given a group G the lemma below shows that the set of admissible values of any other group G = G · σ will be a subset, not necessarily proper, of A(G). Proof. The proof is by induction on y:
• Base case. G = G · : It is immediate by observing that G = G. Thus A(G) = A(G ). • Inductive case. We assume the above is true up to G = σ, in the inductive step we have to show that it holds for the two possible extensions of σ. Case (1): G = σ · m, in such a case the set of admissible values does not change. Thus A(σ) = A(G ). Case (2): G = σ · s, suppose that a value v is in A(G ) but not in A(σ). In order to be admissible for G there must exist a proof for each prefix of G ending with an s, this is by construction also an admissibility proof for σ. Therefore A(G ) ⊆ A(σ). Proof. To prove the above it is sufficient to show that each value v in A(G ) is included in dec i . In order for a value to be in A(G ) it must exist an admissibility proof for group G , the admissibility proof implies two things:
(1) that v is in W |σ| (σ) (see Observation 1); (2) that v is in A(σ). From the above, and the code of a correct master p i , v will be in the set V i of Line 11 at epoch |σ|.
Since a master never removes a value from its pro i its decision dec i must include v. This complete the proof since each correct slave p in G never put in its proposal a value that is not in A(G ): by Lemma 2 the set of values that a slave will consider in any possible future execution of Line 11 is included in A(G ).
Lemma 4. Let p be a correct process that decides dec i . Its decision respects Inclusivity and Non-Triviality.
Lemma 5. Let p be a correct process that at some epoch ep ≤ log(n) + 1 updates its proposal pro i with a new value w. For any possible G such that p ∈ G and log(n) + 1 ≥ |G| ≥ ep we have w ∈ A(G).
Lemma 6. For any correct process p i ∈ G with G = we have |A(G)| − |pro i | ≤ n/2 |G|−1 . Moreover, given process p i ∈ G we have |A(G)| ≤ t u and pro i ≥ t d , where t u and t d are the thresholds of group G.
Proof. We will show that for each p i ∈ G it holds that |A(G)| ≤ t u , that |pro i | ≥ t d , and, that t u − t d ≤ n/2 |G|−1 . Recall that t u , t d and t m depend on G. The proof is by induction on G.
• Base case: G = s: it derives immediately from the structure of the lattice and the fact that t d = 0 and t u = n for all processes in G. • Inductive case: By inductive hypothesis the claim holds for σ. We have G = σ · m or G = σ · s. Let t u , t m , t d be the thresholds of group σ, by inductive hypothesis we have |A(σ)| ≤ t u that |pro i | ≥ t d and that t u − t d ≤ n/2 |G|−1 .
-Case G = σ · m. First notice that for master processes the set of admissible values does not change, that is A(σ) = A(G) neither the threshold t u . In such a case we will show that the lattice "shrinks from below" in the sense that by updating the lower bound on pro i our claim holds. Since p i is in G we have that it updates pro i and the new pro i contains a number of elements that are at least t d + tu−t d 2 +1, thus the new t d = t d + tu−t d 2 + 1. By immediate algebraic manipulations we have t u − t d ≤ tu−t d 2 that proves our claim.
-Case G = σ ·s. In such a case we will show that the lattice "shrinks from above". Consider the generic p i ∈ G this implies that at the end of epoch |σ| the set V i contained at most t m elements. It is immediate that since p i is correct each value in A(σ) that is not in V i cannot be admissible in the extension G. Therefore we have |A(G)| ≤ t m , now it remains to show that |pro i | ≥ t d but this is immediate from inductive hypothesis. Thus we have t u = t m and t d = t d , that implies t u − t d ≤ t m − t d ≤ tu−t d 2 .
Observation 2. Any correct process decides at epoch log(n) + 1.
Lemma 7. Given any pair p i , p j of processes in C their decision dec i and dec j are comparable.
Proof. Let G i be the group where p i belongs at the end of epoch r = log(n) + 1, and let G j the analogous for p j . If G i and G j share a common prefix σ such that σ · m is a prefix of G i and σ · s is a prefix of G j , then Lemma 3 shows the comparability. The only case when the above (or the symmetric of the above) does not hold is if G = G i = G j . In this case, we will show that dec i = dec j . Suppose the contrary, then we have that there exists at least a value v ∈ dec i and such that v ∈ dec j . By Lemma 5 we have v ∈ A(G), and by Lemma 2 v is in each prefixes of G. Suppose p i inserted v in its proposal in an epoch ep such that it has been master again in epoch ep > ep, however this implies that also p j is master in ep , and p i being correct in epoch ep it gradecasts v that will be included in the proposal of p j . The above implies that v has been received and inserted by p i in its proposal exactly in the last epoch in which p i became master. Let ep last be such an epoch. Note that if t u − t d ≤ 2 then v is also in the proposal of p j (both processes enter in the master group in ep last ): in case t u − t d = 2 to become master each process has to collect enough values to trespass the threshold t m , recall that t m = t d + 1 and thus it has to collect t u values, but those and are all the admissible values (by Lemma 6). In the other case, when t u − t d = 1, a process has also to collect all admissible values (t m = t d and t u = t m + 1) (by Lemma 6).
Therefore, t u −t d > 2 in ep last , however by the structure of the algorithm and the number of epochs being log(n) + 1 we eventually have an epoch ep > ep last such that t u − t d = 1 and t m = t d , when this happens process p j will become master upon receipt of v from p i (by Lemma 5 v is admissible for p j ). This contradicts the fact that G i = G j , since p i is never again a master after epoch ep last .
From previous lemmas we have: Theorem 2. Given the lattice L constituted by the power set of the first n natural numbers with union as join operation, GAC is a correct LA algorithm on L, that terminates in O(log(n)) rounds and tolerates up to n/3 − 1 Byzantine processes.
V. ADAPTING GAC TO WORK ON ARBITRARY SEMI-LATTICES IN log(f ) ROUNDS
We first explain how to adapt the GAC algorithm to work in log(f ) on L n when each correct proposes a different unique value in {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}}. We call such an algorithm GAC f ast , we then discuss how to adapt GAC f ast to work on a generic join semi-lattice dropping the assumption of different proposal values. The main idea is to modify epoch 0 to satisfy two needs: (1) to force Byzantines to commit to a certain value; (2) to make all processes collect at least n − f different proposal values. This allows the thresholds to be set to t d = n − f, t u = n, t m = n − f 2 in all processes at the end of epoch 0. The modified epoch 0 is Algorithm 3. The code follows the old one with the notable exceptions that: a correct process updates its proposal by including all values, in E, that have been seen with rank at least 2, and it updates its thresholds accordingly.
Algorithm 3 GAC f ast : Collect and Commit Epoch 0 -Algorithm for process p i 1: G = , pro i , P roof s = {} 2: function LA-PROPOSE(pro i ) 3:
P i =RCV() 6:
V i = {∀v ∈ M |M ∈ P i ∧ M rank is equal 2 ∧v ∈ E} 7: G = G · s 8:
pro i = V i 9:
updateproof s(pro i , P i , 0) Epoch 0 -end 10:
t d = n − f, tu = n, tm = t d + tu−t d 2 11:
. . .
Remain as Algorithm 2 but for line 8
The remaining of the algorithm is the same as Algorithm 2 but for line 8 where we have ep ∈ [1 . . . , log(f ) + 1].
a) Correctness discussion: The same lemmas and observations of Section IV-C hold with the following exceptions:
Lemma 8. For any correct process p i ∈ G with G = we have |A(G)| − |pro i | ≤ f /2 |G|−1 . Moreover, given process p i ∈ G we have |A(G)| ≤ t u and pro i ≥ t d , where t u and t d are the thresholds of group G. Theorem 3. Given the lattice L constituted by the power set of the first n natural numbers with union as join operation and where each correct process proposes a distinct element in {{1}, . . . , {n}}, GAC f ast is a correct LA that terminates in O(log(f )) rounds and tolerates up to n/3 − 1 Byzantine processes.
A. Arbitrary Semi-lattices L A
We adapt GAC f ast to work on an arbitrary join semilattice L A = (V A , ⊕), an arbitrary set E A ⊆ V A of allowed proposal values, and an arbitrary mapping of proposal values and correct processes (recall that in previous section we were assuming a different proposal value for each correct). The adaptation works by running GAC f ast on an intermediate semi-lattice L * . Lattice L * is the one induced by the union operation over the power set of V * = Π × E A . The set V * is constituted by all possible pairs process ID and initial proposed value pro i (each pro i is in E A ). Each correct process p i starts GAC f ast with input (p i , pro i ).
Note that epoch 0, with is commitment functionality, forces the algorithm to effectively decides on a lattice L * that is the power set of a subset X of V * of cardinality at most n and at least n − f . Such a lattice is isomorphic to the lattice on which the correctness of GAC f ast has been shown in Section V. Once GAC f ast terminates each process p i ∈ C has a decision dec i . This decision dec i is a set {(p i , val i ), . . . , (p x , val x )}, from such a set the process p i obtains a decision dec i on L A where dec i is dec i = D i given D i : {y|∀(x, y) ∈ dec i ∧ y ∈ E A }. This strategy enforces that the decisions dec i and dec j of any two correct processes p i , p j are comparable points on the semi-lattice L A . It is also immediate that nontriviality and inclusivity hold. From the above we have:
Theorem 4. Given f Byzantine processes and n processes in total, if n ≥ 3f + 1, there exists a Byzantine lattice agreement algorithm terminating in O(log f ) rounds in the authenticated message model.
1) Message Complexity:
The provable gradecast generates at most O(n 2 ) messages at each round. Each epoch is composed by 3 rounds and in each epoch all correct processes do a gradecast, thus we have a total of O(n 3 log f ) messages. However, as pointed out in [6] , it is possible to use O(n 2 ) messages in total to run n parallel instances of gradecast (each message will be structured with n locations one for each possible gradecaster). Therefore, our algorithm can be implemented using O(n 2 log f ) messages.
VI. TRADE-OFF BETWEEN SIGNATURES AND NUMBER OF PROCESSES Signatures are used to implement the seen-all proof of our provable gradecast primitive (explained in Section IV-A). By assuming n ≥ 4f + 1 processes we may implement an interactive version of the seen-all proof that does not use signatures. We explain the interactive provable gradecast algorithm when n = 4f + 1, the extension for n > 4f +1 is immediate. The modifications with respect to Section IV-A are as follows:
• The threshold of line 23 remains f + 1, the one of line 20 becomes 3f + 1, the threshold of line 14 is 3f + 1. Therefore, a message will have rank 1 if seen with multiplicity at least f + 1, a message has rank 2 if seen with multiplicity at least 3f + 1.
• The seen-all proof S ps,mi is simply a set of IDs. These IDs are the ones of processes from which p i receives m i in the receive phase of round 3.
The seen-all proof S ps,mi is checked in an interactive way by querying each process contained in the set S ps,mi . The proof passes if at least 2f + 1 of such processes confirm to have relayed m i in the relevant gradecast instance. It is obvious that by increasing the two thresholds we do not affect the original properties of the gradecast (discussed in Section IV-A).
Using the interactive provable gradecast and the straightforward interactive variant of the admissibility proof we have:
Theorem 5. Given f Byzantine processes and n processes in total, if n ≥ 4f + 1, then there exists a byzantine lattice agreement algorithm terminating in O(log f ) rounds in the authenticated channel model.
We argue that the interactive provable gradecast generates at most O(n 2 ) messages at each round. The additional cost introduced by the interactive proof is at most O(n) per round. Thus the total asymptotic cost remains the same: O(n 2 log f ) messages.
VII. AN UNIVERSAL TRANSFORMER FROM LA TO GENERALISED LA
In this section we show a transformer algorithm that builds upon a LA algorithm to create a Byzantine tolerant Generalised LA algorithm. We consider the definition of [7] adapted for a synchronous system. In the Synchronous Generalised LA, each correct process p i receives input values from an infinite sequence P ro i = pro 0 , pro 1 , pro 2 , . . . where each pro k is a value inside a set of admissible values E (note that E is not necessarily finite). Without loss of generality we imagine that at each round r, p i receives a value pro r ∈ P ro i (note that this is not restrictive since we could modify the lattice to admit a neutral element, such as ∅). A correct process p i must output an infinite number of decision values Dec i = dec 0 , dec 1 , dec 2 , . . . . The sequence of decisions has to satisfy the following properties:
• Liveness: each correct process p i ∈ C performs an infinite sequence of decisions Dec i = dec 0 , dec 1 , dec 2 , . . . ; • Local Stability: For each p i ∈ C its sequence of decisions is non decreasing (i.e., dec h ⊆ dec h+1 , for any dec h ∈ Dec i ); • Comparability: Any two decisions of correct processes are comparable, even when they happen on different processes;
• Inclusivity: Given any correct process p i ∈ C, if P ro i contains a value pro k , then pro k is eventually included in dec h ∈ Dec i ; • Non-Triviality: Given any correct process p i ∈ C if p i outputs some decision dec k at a round r, then dec k ≤ (P rop[0 : r] ∪ B[0 : g(r)]), where, P rop[0 : r] is the union of the prefixes, until index r, of all sequences P ro i of correct processes; and, B[0 : g(r)] is the union of all prefixes, until index r, of f infinite sequences B i , one for each Byzantine process. Function g is g : N → N. Each B i is a sequence of elements in E.
Intuitively, function g upper bounds the number of values that Byzantine processes can insert. a) Transformer: We now explain the high level idea behind the transformer. Let LA be a one shot synchronous lattice agreement algorithm that terminates in δ rounds. We divide the time in terms, a term lasts for δ rounds and it allows to execute, from start to termination, an instance of LA. At the beginning of term k, correct processes start the k-th instance of LA, we denote it as k-LA. Each correct process receives from upper layer a stream of elements in E, and it batches such elements until a new instance of LA starts. Let C k be the k-th batch, at the beginning of term k, process p i starts the instance k-LA with input (p i , dec k−1 ⊕ C k ), where dec k−1 is the output of the (k − 1)-LA instance. There are few minor details to add to this description to get an actual algorithm (see pseudocode in Algorithm 4), the most important being the mechanism needed to bound the number of values that could be added by Byzantine processes. The key idea is to start the instance k-LA with a set of admissible values P T (k−1)+δ , that is the set of all subsets of E of size less or equal to T (k − 1) + δ. Function T is a function mapping each index of the decision sequence of a correct process to an upper bound on the maximum size of the decision, where the size is counted as number of elements in the decision. We assume T (−1) = 0; we have that T (0) = δ · n: each correct process that starts the first instance of LA proposes at most δ values; the closed form for k > 0 of T (k) is in the statement of Lemma 9. b) Correctness discussion: Assuming that each LA is an instance of a correct LA algorithm (according to definition in Section II-0a), we argue that the Generalised LA algorithm obtained by using our transformer is a correct algorithm for definition in Section VII. The liveness property is satisfied by the liveness of each instance of LA. The local stability and the inclusivity derive directly from the fact that once a process p outputs dec k−1 , the next instance of LA will have as input a value that contains (p, dec k−1 ⊕ C k ). Therefore, by inclusivity of LA we have that the decision of k-LA contains the pair (p, dec k−1 ⊕ C k ), and this means that dec k−1 ⊕ C k ≤ dec k . It remains to show the nontriviality:
Lemma 9. Consider the sequence of decisions of a correct process p executing the transformer in Algorithm 4. Each dec k in the sequence, decided at round r, respects the Non-Triviality property for a function g(r) < (T (k) = δ·n((f +1) k+1 −1) f ). X : {y|(x, y) ∈ dec } 10: dec = X 11:
Decision k (dec)
